Power of Court of Appeals to Grant Reversal on Weight of Evidence -- Jurisdiction by Wenger, Vernon W.
legislation; but under this section, there could be no emergency with
reference to an ordinance passed authorizing a contract with a public
utility.
"If we give effect to the general provision of the Constitution (re-
ferring to Article II, Section i-f), the authorizing statutes enacted
thereunder, and the special provision relating to ordinances enacted by
Council, the only construction that could be given to the latter would
be that it was a limitation on the powers of Council and did not in any
way effect the rights reserved to the people to initiate an ordinance au-
thorizing a contract." (Italics, the writer's).
Since the Court of Appeals in the principal case issued a decree of
injunction on the basis of the constitutional question raised, and since
the court in Goodman v. Hamilton, (supra) reached a directly opposite
conclusion, it is to be regretted that the Supreme Court of Ohio refused
to pass on that particular question when it held that there was no con-
stitutional question involved.
JAMES R. TRITsCHLER.
POWER OF COURT OF APPEALS TO GRANT REVERSAL ON
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE - JURISDICTION.
The case of Werner v. Rowley, 129 Ohio St. 15, 193 N.E. 623,
I Ohio Op. 303, 16 Abs. 378 (I934), involved an action for personal
injuries. The plaintiff recovered a verdict in the first trial which on
the defendant's motion was set aside as being against the weight of the
evidence. On the second trial of the cause, the plaintiff again received
a verdict to which the defendant objected again on the grounds that it
also was against the weight of the evidence. While the Court of Appeals
considered other errors assigned, it refused to consider the assignment
that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and held that by
the cases of Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Trendel, Ioi Ohio St. 316, 128 N.E.
136 (1920), and Rolf v. Heil, II 3 Ohio St. 113, 148 N.E. 398
(1925), it was precluded from so doing. In the Werner case, supra,
the Supreme Court overruled these cases and held Section 11577, Gen-
eral Code, unconstitutional as applicable to the facts of that case.
Although not so stated in the opinion the decision in the Werner case
also overrules Mahoning Valley R.R. Co. v. Santoro, 93 Ohio St. 51,
112 N.E. 190 (i91), which held in effect that when the Court of
Appeals has granted one reversal on the weight of the evidence, it can-
not grant a second reversal on the same ground. The statute provides
that the trial court shall not grant more than one new trial on the
NOTES AND COMMENTS 297
LAW JOURNAL -MAY, 1935
weight of the evidence against the same party in the same case and that
not more than one judgment of reversal shall be granted on this ground.
The pertinent constitutional provision involved in Section 6, Art. IV as
amended in 1912: "The courts of appeal shall have . . . . appellate
jurisdiction in the trial of chancery cases, and to review, affirm, modify
or reverse the judgment of the courts of common pleas, superior courts
and courts of record within the district as may be provided by law."
It is to be observed at this point that no question is raised as to whether
Section 11577 General Code is a usurpation of judicial power as con-
ferred by Article IV, Section i and this matter is not considered in this
note.
It is a necessary hypothesis of the opinion in the Werner case that
the Constitution, through the section above quoted, is the sole source
of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals which the legislature can
neither enlarge nor restrict; and second, that restricting the Court of
Appeals to but one reversal on the weight of the evidence is a matter
of jurisdiction.
The first assumption is well supported by precedent in Ohio, the
leading case being Cincinnati Polyclinic v. Balch, 92 Ohio St. 415,
I I i N.E. 159 (1915). As pointed out by Chief Justice Nichols in his
dissenting opinion to this case, however, there is some basis for doubting
the soundness of this proposition. From 1802 to 185 1 the jurisdiction
of all courts of the state, except as specifically stated by the Constitution,
was of legislative and not of constitutional origin. Section 2, Art. III
of the Constitution of 1802 provides that the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction both in law and chancery in such cases as directed
by law. Section 4 of the same article provides that the Supreme Court
and Court of Common pleas shall have appellate criminal jurisdiction
in such cases and in such manner as may be pointed out by law; Section
5, Art. III providing that the Court of Common Pleas shall have juris-
diction of all probate and testamentary matters and such other cases as
shall be prescribed by law. Thus "directed," "pointed out," and "pre-
scribed by law" were the terms used and generally understood as con-
ferring power on the legislature to regulate the jurisdiction of these
courts. Ludlow v. Johnson, 3 Ohio 553 (1827), Way v. Hilhr-, I6
Ohio 105 (1847), Inre Gregory, i Ohio 357 (185o).
The Constitution of 1851, Section 2, Art. IV in conferring appel-
late jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, designated this as such power
"'as may be provided by law," the same term as employed in the amend-
ment of 1912 to Article IV, Section 6, in reference to Appellate courts.
The same phrase was employed when the Circuit Court was created by
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amendment to the Constitution Oct. 9, 1883; appellate jurisdiction was
such as was provided by law. Section 6, Art. IV. Section 8, Art. IV.
creating the Probate Court provided that the Probate Court shall have
jurisdiction in probate and testamentary matters and such other jurisdic-
tion in any county or counties as may be provided by law. In Railway
Co. v. O'Hara, 48 Ohio St. at 354, 30 N.E. 958 (189i) this was
interpreted to mean that the legislature had the power to regulate and
add to the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.
In the Cincinnati case, supra, after the amendment of 1912, the
court treated the clause "as may be provided by law" to mean that the
legislature had the power to provide only the method for the exercise
of the jurisdiction. It would seem, in the light of previous interpretation
of the phrase "as may be provided by law" that if a change were in-
tended in its meaning it would have been explicitly provided for by the
framers of the Constitution. However this may be, it seems to be well
settled in Ohio that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
comes from the Constitution with which jurisdiction there can be no
interference by the legislature or otherwise.
Next, the question arises whether the denial of the power of the
Court of Appeals to grant more than one reversal on the weight of the
evidence or to pass on the weight of the evidence after the trial court
has granted one new trial on this ground is an invasion of appellate
jurisdiction as conferred by the Constitution or merely a matter of pro-
cedure which it is conceded the General Assembly may regulate. " 'Juris-
diction has been defined: The power to hear and determine a cause;
the authority by which judicial officers take cognizance of and decide
them; the power of a court or judge to entertain an action, petition, or
other proceedings; a power constitutionally conferred upon a judge or
magistrate to take cognizance of and determine causes according to
law.' i5 C.J. 723. While practice or procedure is 'The mode of
proceeding by which a legal right is enforced; that which regulates the
formal steps in an action or other judicial proceedings; course of pro-
cedure in courts; the form, manner, or order in which proceedings have
been and are accustomed to be led; the form, manner, and order of
conducting and carrying on suits or presentations in the courts through
their various stages, according to the principles of law and the rules laid
down by the respective courts.' 40 C.J. 1312. Jurisdiction relates to the
forum, court, or judge that may hear and determine a legal cause or
controversy, while practice or procedure relates to the form or manner
of conducting the suit." Mahoning Valley R.R. Co. v. Santoro, 93
Ohio St. at 56, 112 N.E. 190 (1915).
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Considering what has previously been treated by the Supreme Court
as an invasion of jurisdiction we find the court in Cincinnati v. Balch,
supra, holding unconstitutional a statute which provided that civil cases
which can be appealed from the municipal court of Cincinnati would be
limited to cases involving three hundred dollars or more, Section 6,
Art. IV was construed to mean that courts of appeal had appellate juris-
diction to review, affirm, modify or reverse all judgments of the courts
of common pleas whereas the statute attempted to divest the court of
power to pass on judgments of less than three hundred dollars. Sim-
ilarly when the legislature attempted to increase the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals by Section 12224 General Code providing that in all
cases where the right to demand a jury trial did not exist an appeal
might be taken from a judgment in a civil action, the court held that
the right to appeal as set out in the Constitution was limited to chancery
cases and that this couldn't be enlarged by any action of the legislature.
Wagner v. Armstrong, 93 Ohio St. 443, 113 N.E. 397 (1915). To
the same effect was the decision in In re Hawke, 107 Ohio St. 341,
14o N.E. 583 (1923), where Section 17o9 General Code attempted
to give right of appeal in disbarment proceedings.
In .Albertini v. Shaffer, 15 Ohio App. 55, 32 C.C.N.S. 245
(1921), Judge Washburn treated Section 12270 General Code, pro-
viding that the petition in error shall be filed within 70 days after entry
of final judgment or order, as depriving the Court of Appeals of juris-
diction if not complied with; further jurisdiction cannot be conferred on
the Court of Appeals by appearance alone. He contends that while Art.
IV, Section 6 confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals, still this
power, giving effect to the phrase "as may be provided by law," is con-
ditions on limitations which the legislature may provide. In Craig v.
WelPY, 104 Ohio St. 312, 136 N.E. 143 (1922), the Supreme Court
treated the same statute as providing only for a method of the exercise
of the jurisdiction, a matter of procedure as contrasted with matter of
jurisdiction.
The court in State ex rel. Medical Centre Co. v. Wallace, 107
Ohio St. 557, 14o N.E. 305 (1923), held to be unconstitutional Sec-
tion 1579-36 General Code, which provided in effect that no petition
in error should be filed in actions of forcible entry and detention orig-
inating in the municipal court of Cleveland except on leave of the Court
of Appeals. Here certainly no power was taken away from the Court
of Appeals, but in a sense power was added zuz., to refuse to hear case
on appeal. This seems to be somewhat removed from the Cincinnati
case, supra, but a more evident illustration of the trend of the decisions
to restrict more and more the power of the legislature to infringe even
indirectly on the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is found
in the cases of Haas v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 95 Ohio St. 137 ,
115 N.E. 1020 (1917), and Commonwealth Oil Co. v. Turk, 118
Ohio St. 273, 16o N.E. 856 (1928). The question involved was
whether the right existed to appeal from the Superior Courts of Cincin-
nati and Cleveland directly to the Court of Appeals. It was contended
that since Section 12224 General Code provided for appeal only from
courts of Common Pleas, exclusion of the right to appeal from any other
court resulted by implication. It was held in both cases that the right
to appeal existed independent of any legislative provision and by analogy
the same procedure as provided for by statute for appeals from the Com-
mon Pleas court should be followed. The basis for the contention that
these cases are one step removed from the Cincinnati case, supra, rests
on the fact that here no attempt was made on the part of the legislature
to exclude cases arising in municipal court from appeal; rather by impli-
cation there seemed to be a legislative attempt to regulate the channel
through which cases arising in the Municipal Court could reach the
Court of Appeals, viz., by appeal first to the Court of Common Pleas,
thence to the Court of Appeals. From this it could be argued that there
was no interference with appellate jurisdiction but only a rule of pro-
cedure necessary to be followed to get into that court in like manner as
commencement of proceedings within 70 days after entry of final order
of judgment.
As suggested by Judge Wannamaker in Mahoning Valley Railroad
Co. v. Santoro, supra, it would hardly be claimed that Section I 1576
General Code providing grounds on which a new trial may be granted
is a matter involving jurisdiction but rather relates to practice and pro-
cedure-merely a method of the exercise of the power. One of the
grounds there provided is that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient
evidence; this is used interchangeably with the term weight of the evi-
dence. Brittian v. Industrial Commission, 95 Ohio St. 391, 115 N.E.
i io (1916). If this is treated as a matter of procedure where the trial
court is concerned, why does it become a matter of jurisdiction when
applied to the Court of Appeals? Further, even if grounds for a new
trial are treated as matters of jurisdiction, it is within the power of the
legislature to regulate them as the General Assembly is the sole source
of jurisdiction of courts of common pleas, Article IV, Section 4 of the
Constitution, Allen v. Smith, 84 Ohio St. 283, 95 N.E. 829 (I91I).
Hence it would follow that the legislature could abolish the right of
the trial court to grant a new trial on the weight of the evidence; yet a
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necessary result would be to deprive the Court of Appeals of the power
to review on these grounds. Otherwise we would have the anomalous
situation of a legislature without power to undo that which it originally
could do, and this without constitutional intervention.
To substantiate its position, the court in the Werner case, supra,
stated, in referring to the provision in the Constitution that concurrence
of all the judges of the courts of appeal is necessary to grant a reversal
on the weight of the evidence, "That provision of the Constitution con-
notes the fact that judges of the Court of Appeals under the Constitu-
tion have the right to pass on the weight of the evidence limited only
that this shall be done by concurrence of all the judges (Italics mine).
And yet the court by way of dicta through Judge Jones promulgated a
rule of court that the Court of Appeals is without power to pass on the
weight of the evidence unless a motion for new trial is made in the
lower court. Jacob Laub Baking Co. v. Middleton, I 18 Ohio St. io6,
16o N.E. 629 (1928). Further the litigant defeated a second time if
once he has obtained a new trial on the weight of the evidence is pre-
cluded by virtue of section I577 General Code from receiving a second
trial on the same ground and yet according to the Baking Co. case,
supra, if he did not ask for the second trial the court of appeals will not
pass on the question. In Majors v. The Cleveland Interurban K.R. Co.,
127 Ohio St. 255, 187 N.E. 857 (1933), Judge Jones again by dicta,
incorporated into the syllabus, however, stated that when there is a
reversal in the court of appeals because of the failure of the trial court
to direct a verdict, it is the duty of the Court of Appeals to enter final
judgment. This result is based on Section 12272 General Code. It
seems difficult to understand how limitation on number of reversals
which Court of Appeals can give involves jurisdiction while power to
enter final judgment is only a matter of procedure.
The decision of the Werner case, supra, represents the ever increas-
ingly narrow interpretation of Article IV, Section 6 with reference to the
phase "as may be provided by law" with the corresponding limitation on
the power of the legislature. If it is the fear that the legislature is en-
croaching on the judicial power conferred on the courts (Art. IV,
Section I) which prompts the court more and more to curtail any inter-
ference by the legislature, it would seem desirable to rest their decisions
on this ground. The logical result of the trend of the decisions will
necessarily be a crystallization of the rules of procedure and practice as
applied to the court of appeals subject to change only by constitutional
amendment, both the legislature and the courts being without power to
make any alteration which changing conditions or expediency may
demand. VERNON W. WENGER
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